Sep 17, 2015
The Iran nuclear deal proposes limiting Iran's production of
enriched uranium and plutonium – the two fissile materials used to
build nuclear weapons – in exchange for the end of international
oil and financial sanctions. So far, negotiations have primarily
focused on Iran's capacity to produce enriched uranium. But the
world’s stockpiles of separated plutonium has grown enormously over
the decades. Today, there is enough separated plutonium – which is
extracted from highly radioative spent fuel produced by nuclear
reactors – to produce 30,000 nuclear bombs, according to metrics
provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency.* In this
WooCast, we discuss the process of plutonium separation – and its
associated risks – with M.V. Ramana, a physicist and lecturer at
Princeton University's Program on Science and Global Security,
based at the Woodrow Wilson School. Ramana is part of the
International Panel on Fissile Materials, an independent group of
arms-control experts from 18 countries. The group recently
published a report on the status of plutonium separation in nuclear
power programs around the world. They are also working on issues
related to the Iran nuclear deal. * The IAEA defines a "significant
quantity" of fissile material to be the amount required to make a
first-generation implosion bomb, including production losses. That
number is 25 kilograms of uranium 235 contained in highly enriched
uranium and 8 kilograms of plutonium.